Regional Formation and Development Studies

This article addresses intersections of migration and economic development as one of the most topical contemporary challenges inthe Baltic states. It uses empirical approach to compare governmental responses to recent economic crisis starting in 2008. Articleanalyses, how these responses were reflected in statistics revealing socio economic dynamics within years of crisis and beyond.Methods of comparing statistical and analysing secondary data are applied. All three states have similar future challenges of agingand declining population and see return migration as one of possible solutions to address this challenge. However, the processesin Estonia provide a better ground for its government to claim that the country makes effort to ensure more stable development.Also, the results demonstrate that Estonia displays more different trends, while Lithuania and Latvia are closer to each other in outmigrationtrends.

Disintegration of the USSR and join of Baltic States to European Union made this one a border territory between Russia and EU. After the collapse of Former Soviet Union, the new boundary remained almost easy to cross. In the beginning of the 21th century, it became no more fuzzy but rather fixed. Since European enlargement that had taken place in 2004, the crossing has become more regulated. People need visas that meant administrative papers and cost. The evolution of cargo flows has been more contrasted. Economic policies, political stakes and traditional links, are elements to understand East Baltic area. Kaliningrad Oblast, the Russian exclave lying by the Baltic Sea, strengthens the interest of the purpose.

The 2008 global economic and financial crisis hit hard in Iceland and Latvia. Economic developments prior to the crisis, as well as response to the crisis were, however, different in these two countries, yielding different results. Both countries received assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the crisis and the IMF has labeled their reform programs as success stories. This article reviews and evaluates the post crisis situation in Iceland and Latvia, both in terms economic performance, as well as social progress. It also discusses how other countries, as well a multilateral institutions, may have influenced the reform programs in Iceland and Latvia.

Iceland is a small, resource rich country in Europe that is highly dependent on foreign trade. According to the World Bank classifications, Iceland is a high income economy, but with a population of a little bit more than 300 thousand inhabitants, is the smallest economy within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Iceland is highly dependent on foreign trade, especially on trade with the European Union, where economic and political integration is evolving and the question about the most feasible level of participation is a future challenge for the country. Iceland is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen area, and the European Union (EU) candidate country until recently, when its government decided to withdraw its EU membership application. Currently, the EEA agreement ensures Iceland access to the EU common market. The question remains, what is the most feasible arrangement for Iceland’s prosperity in the long term? Should it continue to rely on the current arrangement? Should it seek the EU membership in the future and, perhaps, subsequently become part of the Euro Area? What are the possible benefits and disadvantages for Iceland joining the EU and the Euro Area?

The article argues that the Soviet Union, like other powerful states, supported Lithuania’s decision to give up the idea of fighting for Klaipėda Region and obeying Nazi Germany’s demand for its occupation. Such a position was not openly and vividly demonstrated by Moscow politicians for the purpose of sustaining a two-decade-lasting image of being Lithuania’s protectors and supporters in the international arena. During the interwar period, the Soviets acknowledged Germany’s rising interest in Klaipėda, and since 1938, they were sure that Lithuania would have never managed to safeguard Klaipėda’s territory. Despite the fact that the Soviets did not intervene in the Nazi expansion, they indirectly responded by spreading their influence on the Baltic region. That was done by demanding territorial extensions from Finland and thus limiting the political sovereignty of Lithuania and Estonia. Hence, in the spring of 1939, more clearly pronounced zones of influence were drawn onto the Baltic States by Germany and the USSR.