Regional Formation and Development Studies

The author considers scientific background of the methods and instruments of monetary policy under the integration conditions in the post-Soviet space. Analysis of formation conditions of the Economic and Monetary Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kirgizstan is presented. Findings about the expediency of the use of various theoretical approaches to regulation of exchange rate within the formation of state’s currency policy under globalization conditions are introduced. Problems of monetary and currency policy along with directions of their development in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are discussed. The directions of monetary and currency policy coordination within EAEU are offered. The author defines possibilities of their realisation under present conditions.

The 2008 global economic and financial crisis hit hard in Iceland and Latvia. Economic developments prior to the crisis, as well as response to the crisis were, however, different in these two countries, yielding different results. Both countries received assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the crisis and the IMF has labeled their reform programs as success stories. This article reviews and evaluates the post crisis situation in Iceland and Latvia, both in terms economic performance, as well as social progress. It also discusses how other countries, as well a multilateral institutions, may have influenced the reform programs in Iceland and Latvia.

The Nordic Baltic region (5+3) is now closely interlinked via trade, investment, mobility of people, and banking. All the countries in this group have pursued some form of integration with the European Union (EU). Six of them are EU member states, four of them are members of the euro area, and all of them are within the European Economic Area (EEA) and are Schengen member states. But can these small countries as a group cooperate more closely and perhaps exercise more collective authority in Europe? The Nordic countries and the Baltic States cooperate in the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, and six of them are among European NATO member states. When it comes to European integration the lack of common approach complicates their cooperation. Within this group there are internal divisions between the hardcore EU and euro area member states (the Baltics and Finland), EU members (Denmark and Sweden) and EU outsiders (Iceland and Norway). Common pathways for the future cooperation in Europe may be hard to find. Also, the Nordics are high income welfare states, but the Baltics are neoliberal with minimal governments and low-tax regimes. Additionally, external forces continue to challenge the Nordic Baltic region, including revanchist Russian policies threatening Baltic Sovereignty, unpredictable US policies towards NATO as well as reduced military presence in Europe, and dismal EU and euro area post crisis economic performance. All point to a future of uncertainty including both economic and security risks.

The 2008 global economic and financial crisis hit hard in Iceland. During the crisis its three largest banks all collapsed in just a few days with severe consequences for the economy and the people. Prior to the crisis, Iceland, a high income OECD country, had experienced strong growth and unprecedented expansion in overseas investments and activities, especially in the financial sector. This article focuses on the actions of the international community when the Icelandic authorities, during a period of great uncertainty, sought assistance to protect the Icelandic economy before the banking system fell. The methodology used in this article is the case study method. Compared to other research methods, a case study enables the researcher to examine the issues involved in greater depth. Arguably, the governments of the Netherlands and the UK tried to fake reality by suggesting that the Icelandic government, i.e. Icelandic taxpayers, should be made responsible for paying the debts of private banks. The EFTA Court ruling confirms that Iceland did not have this responsibility. In retrospect one can argue that the EU showed dishonesty by supporting the Netherlands and the UK in demanding a sovereign guarantee for failed private banks. The Icelandic banking expansion exposed weaknesses in EU integration and may also confirm a certain incompetence within the EU in designing an EU-wide banking system.