Klaipėdos universitetas

The article argues that the Soviet Union, like other powerful states, supported Lithuania’s decision to give up the idea of fighting for Klaipėda Region and obeying Nazi Germany’s demand for its occupation. Such a position was not openly and vividly demonstrated by Moscow politicians for the purpose of sustaining a two-decade-lasting image of being Lithuania’s protectors and supporters in the international arena. During the interwar period, the Soviets acknowledged Germany’s rising interest in Klaipėda, and since 1938, they were sure that Lithuania would have never managed to safeguard Klaipėda’s territory. Despite the fact that the Soviets did not intervene in the Nazi expansion, they indirectly responded by spreading their influence on the Baltic region. That was done by demanding territorial extensions from Finland and thus limiting the political sovereignty of Lithuania and Estonia. Hence, in the spring of 1939, more clearly pronounced zones of influence were drawn onto the Baltic States by Germany and the USSR.

The western European powers and their allies, including the Baltic States, were more concerned about the unavoidable economic losses of war, while Germany was a prisoner of its delusions about the potential economic advantages of war. The commanders of the Lithuanian army benefited from some tactical lessons during the Klaipėda crisis. The first and most important lesson was that it was nearly impossible to defend the country without some impact on the society as a whole and on the mobilisation of the economy. In reality, only a few units could be activated, and even those available to provide road cover had a shortage of personnel and modes of transport. The commanders realised that even if they were to develop plans for mobilisation, the implementation of those plans could not be assured, as the enemy forces were significantly more advanced technologically. The danger of a politically motivated delay or demands by a foreign country would postpone any plans and make mobilisation too late. The analysis of the principal problems demonstrated that the main issues were not even grounded in the clear technological advantages or differences between the Lithuanian and other armies. Quite the opposite: the most important problems were related to slow planning, a lack of coordination, late communications, and unclear subordination in the chain of command. Not less problematic was the basic discipline of the commanding officers, as well as a lack of political resolve in the climate of authoritarian dictatorship which paralysed the whole decision-making process. This combination determined the system’s outlook and its capacity to resist a foreign, that of German Reich’s, invasion in 1939.

The article deals with the Lithuanian Army Headquarters’ defence plans for Klaipėda Region (Memel Territory) and Klaipėda City against Germany of the 1930s, providing options of implementation in the event of a military conflict between Lithuania and Germany. The article also provides the data on the Lithuanian armed forces at disposal in 1939, the size of the forces deployed in Klaipėda Region and on its borders, the Army Headquarters plans to use the said military forces, and the potential scenarios of the events. In terms of the military doctrine, an overview of the condition and its potential significance for the sea frontier defence of the Lithuanian Navy is given.

The article analyzes the plans of Germany to seize Klaipėda Region in 1938, the political circumstances of the German ultimatum issued to Lithuania on March 20, 1939, the response of the Lithuanian Government to the German demands, the organization of the retreat of Lithuanian military units and state institutions from Klaipėda, its process, and the dynamics of German units marching into Klaipėda Region.

The article examines the impact of the identity-making processes on the ideological preparation of the annexation of Klaipeda Region in 1939. As early as in 1919-1920, efforts were made to unite local inhabitants of Klaipeda Region on the basis of their common past, shared traditions, and belonging to the German culture. For that purpose, a new identity concept “Memelländer” was designed. In 1938, its content was partially geared to another concept of “Memeldeutsche”. The paper analyzes and compares the meanings attributed to both of those concepts and supported within the public communication space, as well as the ceremonies and rites which were to unite local inhabitants on the basis of those meanings. It examines which institutions and groups of people made efforts to maintain them and why. By analysing the possibilities of the impact of those meanings, a new interpretation of Memelländer is proposed. It is based on the view that the concept of “Memelländer” (and subsequently, “Memeldeutsche”) should be treated as situational rather than a stable expression of the identity of Klaipeda Region’s local inhabitants.

The article deals with the historical circumstances and reasons which predetermined the possession of Klaipeda by Lithuania, with the idea and the practice of the Versailles system mainly taken into consideration. As argued by the author, Klaipėda’s jurisdiction to the Lithuanian Code is linked to the balance of power which predetermined the existence of national states in the Eastern and Central Europe, especially in the East Baltic region.