Volume 87, Issue 2 (2021): Volume 87, pp. 14–38
The article analyses the development of employee financial participation in Lithuania, describes the legal environment of financial participation, and supports this participation. Two methods were used to analyse employee financial participation: 1) the method of logical analysis in examining the internal documents of companies; 2) the qualitative research methods of focus group and semi-structured individual interviews. Theories of the agency and stakeholders were used to analyse the data collected. These theories are usually applied in research in an integrated way, analysing employee financial participation to elucidate the phenomenon of employee ownership, and examining the agent’s performance. It has been established that in Lithuania four employee share ownership programmes and plans usually apply: extensive employee share option programmes (granted to public limited companies whose shares are traded on stock exchanges); granting employee stock options to executives (so-called executive stock option programmes and one-time decisions); stock option programmes in start-ups; and shares granted by shareholders to employees.
His article sets out to explore two aspects reported in the literature: we pursued to fulfill the lack of research in the field of preparation and implementation of Lithuanian public management reform; searching for evidence that reforms are based on unclear public management doctrine. Principal – agent theory was applied to execute the aim of current research. The data collected by carried our eight in-depth semi structured interviews. The research sought to identify the change of opinions during the execution of public management reform. It was found, that preparation and implementation of public management reform depends on three factors: (i) value – based public management reform conception; (ii) existence of strong coordination center form reform execution; (iii) support of political – administration resource. However, the participation of political appointees at the reform process highlighted the conflict in their activity. From one hand the support of political appointees reduce control of performance. Otherwise, there is a threat for implementation of public management reform.