

NEW AXES OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGES IN POLAND AFTER 2005

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ABSTRACT

The aim of the study is to analyse new axes of cleavages which came into existence in Poland after 2005. The analysis is presented in the context of generally accepted notions and concepts of political cleavages. The methods used for the analysis are: comparative method and historical method. Findings of the research are presented in the following way. First, the author determines that cleavages in Poland only partially correspond to classical cleavages, then identifies and analyses new stimulators of political cleavages in Poland, which appeared after 2005. A significant role in the consolidation of cleavages played political parties, which instead of translating the existing social conflicts to the level of authority, became the creators of cleavages.

KEYWORDS: *socio-political cleavage, political parties, transition in Poland.*

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Introduction

This study analyses the issue of political cleavages. The notion of a cleavage was first introduced by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, however, it was not precisely defined (Lipset, Rokkan, 1967: 6). Political cleavage is a category which reflects socio-political diversification in the most complete way (Lijphart, 1981). It should be treated as a combination of diversification in both the social and the political system. Such a concept assumes the existence of mutual dependence between the social and political sphere (Bartolini, Mair, 1990). Classical cleavages in Western democracies are: urban rural, owner-worker, centre-periphery, church state (Lipset, Rokkan, 1967).

Cleavages in post-communist Europe bear some similarity to those of industrial democracies, but they are different. The divisions are due to the specific historical circumstances of the region (Deegan-Krause, 2007: 543). Several researchers dealt with the category of political cleavage in Poland with reference to classic cleavages (Herbut, 1997; Markowski, 2000, Sobkowiak, 1999).

Purpose. The aim of the study is to analyse new axes of cleavages which came into existence in Poland after 2005.

Object. The object of the research are political cleavages in contemporary Poland.

After 1989 the main political cleavage in Poland was the post-communist cleavage. Its fundamental axes ran around the assessment of the previous regime and the idea of decommunization and vetting. After 2005 new axes of political cleavages came into being.

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Tasks. The objective of the article is to present the stimuli of cleavages, the factors which played a major part in their appearance. Here it is necessary to present the fundamental socio-political cleavage which played a significant role in 1989–2005, i.e., the so-called post-communist cleavage. Also, the article analyses the category of political cleavage in Poland with reference to classic cleavages. Among the aims of the article there is also the reference of socio-political cleavage to the category of conflict and participation. The role of political parties in the consolidation of cleavages is also shown.

Methods. The methods used for analysis are: comparative method and historical method. Comparative method was used to compare classic cleavages and cleavages in Poland. Historical method was used to analyse the genesis of socio-political divisions in Poland.

1. The determinants of cleavages in Poland

Conflict is an inherent part of socio-political cleavage. The appearance of conflict is a stimulus which motivates individuals to be politically active. Conflict can be incited by a diversified access to participation in the exercising of power and political influence. Therefore, conflict is an important motivator for social groups to become active. At the same time, it is an immanent constituent of the cleavage. The cleavages which function in societies must be based on conflicts. If a cleavage results from some contrasts, diversification, different visions, conflict is bound to appear (Mair, 2006: 371). Of course, the appearance of conflict in political cleavages does not mean that at the same time aspirations for a revolution or a change to status quo will appear. Neither can conflict be treated as a pathology which can upset social balance and destabilise the social system (Sobkowiak, 1999: 117–120). That is why the analysis of political cleavages is necessary in comparison with the category of conflict.

After World War II in Poland the fundamental conflict was based on the “we – them (authority – society)” dichotomy. The traditions of perceiving the authority in Poland are negative. The “we (society) – them (authority)” dichotomy results from historical experience. For long periods of time Polish people were under the influence of externally imposed authorities. After the partitions, for about 150 years the territory of Poland was governed by other countries. Therefore, authority could not be identified with own statehood. A certain change could be observed in 1918–1939, when native authorities were in charge. However, because of strong divisions and political fragmentation they were not perceived in an explicitly positive way. The period of World War II, and in particular German occupation, reinforced the unfriendly attitude towards those in power, on account of the oppressive character of the authority. On the other hand, after World War II the authority was perceived in a negative way because of its dependence on Soviet influence. The “we – them” cleavage was strengthened, and the authorities of the real socialism regime were juxtaposed with the activity of the opposition. That is why the culture of mistrust and learnt helplessness – the indications of the deficit of civic virtue – are considered to be the result of historic heritage.

In the period of real socialism the authority was also seen as imposed from the outside, the society did not feel the bond with those in power. That conflict was particularly visible in the riots against the authority which took place in 1956 in Poznań, in 1970 in Gdańsk and in 1976 in Radom. The conflict was also evident in the activity of anti-communist opposition. The climax of the conflict was the creation of a social movement “Solidarity” – an organisation whose aim was mainly to improve the financial situation of the society, but in a wider context it should also be perceived as protesting against the real socialist regime at that time. “Solidarity” had 10 million members, which proved the involvement of a large part of the society, despite their limited possibility to be a part of political participation similar to that which takes place in democratic countries.

In connection with the change of the political regime after 1989, the Polish society could take full advantage of political participation. Political participation is usually defined as participation in political life (Sobkowiak, 2000: 403–404). The activity has a voluntary nature, and its aim is to affect the election of rulers and political actions.

One can distinguish two approaches to the understanding of political participation. Narrowly understood political participation is an activity which aims to affect the politics. It is expressed through the following types of activity: participation in elections, demonstrations and boycotts, affiliation with political organisations, writing petitions, appeals and manifests. A broader understanding defines political participation as actions which do not affect the politics, but concern it. This includes such initiatives as: declaration of interest in politics, following political events in the media and assimilation of the knowledge about politics (Mider, 2010: 14–16). One of the foundations for the theory of democracy is supposed to be citizens' strong motivation and the will to participate in political life. In practice one can notice a low level of motivation or the lack of it (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, 1995: 134–138).

It seems that while at the beginning of the eighties in the 20th century the Polish society was very involved and strived after changes, the end of the decade looked completely different. The society was tired of the economic crisis, and remembered the putting down of democratisation tendencies through the introduction of martial law in 1981. That is why the changes in 1989 resulted primarily from the involvement of political elites from both sides of the division.

The socio-political changes initiated in 1989 resulted in the appearance of new disputes and conflicts in the society, some of which became the basis for the axis of political cleavages.

The appearance of cleavages in the society is connected with the level of involvement of social groups. In political participation there are three models of involvement which refer to its intensity. The first is an "apolitical man", indifferent to public affairs, focused on his private life, not interested in politics. The second type is a "political man", interested in politics and with the knowledge about current political problems. The third category is an "ideological man", involved in public affairs, closely attached to a specific canon of values. We deal with an efficient functioning of the democratic system when the distribution of the individual models of involvement is as follows. It is favourable if the biggest group is "political men", because they have knowledge about the ongoing political processes. They are also a group which can be described as moderate. They are aware of the necessity of participation in political life, but at the same time they trust the mechanisms of democracy (alternation of power) and they do not aspire to excessive politicisation of public life (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, 1995: 134–138).

The majority of "ideological men", due to the rigidity of their views, being deeply rooted in cleavages and excessive involvement can result in fanaticism or limitation of pluralism. On the other hand, a situation where there is a majority of "apolitical men" can result in excessive anarchy and corruption of authority, which would quickly take advantage of social apathy, all the more so as the phenomenon of the "laxity" of authority appears also in places where societies are involved in political life.

However, one should not judge the "apolitical" group negatively. Because of their low level of emotionality, the group can keep distance in emergency situations, which can favour compromise. Due to their emotions, the "ideological" group can take up affective actions, and it is difficult for them to give up their system of values, which as a consequence does not allow to overcome the cleavages. Moreover, in the opinion of some researchers the lack of participation is also a form of participation or expressing one's opinion.

Such point of view leads us to a simple conclusion: political participation should be moderate, political involvement should not be a dictate or obligation. The distribution of individual social groups in political participation should be heterogeneous. The majority of people overmuch involved in political life does not do political life good, as it can deepen the political cleavages.

Reference books present various positions on the dependence between the political activity of individuals and political cleavages. Some researchers note that people for whom cleavages are the source of membership in political parties are characterised by greater activity in all analysed aspects in most democracies (Gosselin, Toka, 2008: 19). There are also opinions that social cleavages have a negative, if any, effect on political involvement (Gosselin, Toka, 2008: 19). Studies concerning political involvement of young people emphasise that it is not political cleavages, but other elements which determine the participation in political life. A set of factors which motivate the taking up of activity in political participation is extremely diversified. The author is inclined to accept the first position.

At the same time, the analysis of the research results of Polish society, carried out by the Public Opinion Research Centre in Poland, shows an explicit correlation between the views concerning significant axes of cleavages and the supporters of a given political party (*see* Feliksiak, 2014: 127).

2. Political cleavages in Poland in 1989–2005

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the researchers identified the following main cleavages which functioned in the post-communist societies: supporters of the change of regime vs. supporters of the old communist regime; losers in result of economic transformations vs. winners of transformation and supporters of market reforms); supporters of liberation ideas in politics, society and economy vs. supporters of authoritarianism and protectionism, cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism, ethnic division (Kitschelt, 1999).

The political change resulted in the appearance of political pluralism, visible mainly in the functioning of the party system. The Republic of Poland became a democratic country, in which political parties started to participate in the fight for the alternation of power.

The role of a political party is not only the fight for the gaining and keeping of power, but it also has a significant function in the context of the functioning of a socio-political cleavage. We talk about the socio-political cleavage if three interrelated spheres: empirical, normative and organisational, function. The empirical level refers to the distinguishing of specific social groups, which express particular aspirations, interests and aims. These groups are a potential basis for a socio-political cleavage. The normative sphere includes the process of shaping the identity of social groups. At this level in social groups specific beliefs crystallize and the internal awareness of the group is shaped, which refers to specific ideas and values. At the organisational stage the values and beliefs are translated into an institutional level, expressed in the functioning of political parties and interest groups (Herbut, 1999: 106–107).

From an ideal perspective political parties are to express the aspirations which exist in social groups. One of the main functions of political parties is the function of articulation and aggregation of social needs and interests. The role of a party is to find and fish out the interests, aspirations and demands which lie dormant in social groups. The next stage is to name them, define them and indicate as important problems. “(...) In practice, then, what might be seen as a fairly simple and straightforward process - the translation of social conflict into political and party alternatives - turns out to be quite fraught and complex (...) Class divides are usually translated into politics, but, as we have seen, this is not always the case, and not always in the same way (...)” (Mair, 2006: 371).

It is worth to think whether after 1989 political parties in Poland fulfilled that function. The main socio-political cleavage which functioned in Poland after 1989 was the post-communist cleavage (Grabowska, 2004). Several differentiating axes were the basis for the post-communist cleavage. The first one was the attitude to the period of the Polish People’s Republic. On one side there were the determined critics of the former regime who considered the Polish state of 1944-1989 to be dependent and oppressive. On the other side of the cleavage there were people who positively judged the period of the Polish People’s Republic, that axis also included the dispute concerning the assessment of the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981. The attitude towards settling accounts with the former regime was a significant axis of the post-communist cleavage. Here the opponents and supporters of decommunization and vetting clashed. The decommunization was to consist in the liquidation of the institutional remains of the former regime. The vetting meant the settling of accounts with people who created the governing and administrative apparatus of the Polish People’s Republic, which included the desire to vet the secret collaborators of the security service.

In Poland, after 1989 religious cleavage also played a significant part, based on the following axes: attitude towards the role and place of the Church in socio-political life, attitude towards abortion, attitude towards *in vitro*, reference to the possibility of legalisation of same-sex marriages (Kowalczyk, 2014: 3).

The post-communist cleavage also manifested itself in the competition between a party which had its roots in the former regime, and post-Solidarity parties, established as a result of division in the “Solidarity” movement. The Democratic Left Alliance is a grouping which at first operated as a coalition of a number

of left-wing groups and organisations. It dominated the left side of Polish political scene. In 1993-1997 and 2001-2005 it was a party that initiated the ruling coalitions. The fragmentation of the right side of Polish political scene, dissatisfaction with the results of the political transformation elevated the DLA to the position of a leader among Polish political parties. The DLA became part of the axes of the post-communist cleavage by demonstrating a positive attitude to the period of the Polish People's Republic, rejecting the ideas of decommunization and vetting. As a social democratic party, the DLA was in favour of the concept of a secular state, demanding the reduction of the role of the Church in political life. It consistently opposed to the toughening of the abortion law in Poland. However, one must admit that the DLA did not try to wage an ideological war with the Church. This resulted from the genesis of this party. Because of its post-communist roots it was afraid of comparisons with the repressions of the Polish United Workers' Party against the Catholic Church in the period of the Polish People's Republic.

In author's opinion in 1989–2005 mainly the “moderate” group took part in the political participation, despite clear axes the post-communist cleavage was not excessively radical.

Researchers indicate two views which dominated in Poland after 1989 and which talked about two phenomena: the crisis of participation and the deficit of civic virtue. They manifest in a low voter turnout, poor involvement in the activity of political and civil organisations and social discouragement. This state of affairs is explained by a few hypotheses, primarily the effect of political transformation which, shocking as it was, caused disorientation, anomia and dissatisfaction. Historical factors are also shown as the source of aversion to participation.

Among the consequences of the past there is also a tradition of perceiving political participation as an element of participation in a political battle between political parties. The word “battle” is used here, between political rivalries in Poland has assumed this very form, with an aggressive political discourse, without expectation to reach a consensus. This is a consequence of the period of the Polish People's Republic, intensified after 1989 by competition between post-Solidarity and post-communist parties. The competition was an exemplification of a wider division, a so-called post-communist cleavage.

3. New axes of cleavages in Poland

It seemed that this form of rivalry would change after 2005, when parties with the same roots, described as so-called post-Solidarity parties, gained an advantage on the political scene. Unfortunately, the overlapping of the parliamentary and presidential campaigns in 2005 led to a conflict between the Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS). The conflict intensified after 2007 with unsuccessful cohabitation between a Law and Justice President Lech Kaczyński and a Prime Minister Donald Tusk (the Civic Platform). The cleavage deepened in 2010 after the plane crash near Smoleńsk. This tragic event stimulated a significant, deep division.

Polish citizens seized the opportunity to actively take part in political participation through elections and the removal from power of the grouping whose activity was characterised by excessive anarchy. At the same time, the removal of the Democratic Left Alliance from power showed some inconsistency between political cleavages in Poland and political participation. The fall of the Democratic Left Alliance did not result from the stifling of the dominant post-communist cleavage, but from the poorly played role of the ruling party.

One of the fundamental causes for the appearance of cleavages in Poland after 2005 was a significant weakening of the position of the main left-wing grouping in Poland – the Democratic Left Alliance. A relatively big support from the society had a negative effect on the condition of the Democratic Left Alliance, the discipline slackened, which resulted in many negative aspects of the way power was exercised. As a consequence of the work of investigative journalists, many inappropriate actions of the Democratic Left Alliance politicians, accused of corruption, saw the light of day. The period when the Democratic Left Alliance ruled together with the Labour Union (Unia Pracy) and the Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) was characterised by a disclosure of a number of affairs, which effectively abused the society's trust in left-wing groupings.

Researchers point out one more cause for the weakening of the post-communist cleavage. It is a demographic change connected with the replacement of age cohorts. The groups whose professional activity fell on the eighties of the 20th century are now retired, while the demographic groups who remember the former regime only from tradition are reaching maturity (Łukowski, Sadowski, 2013: 24).

After 2005 we dealt with new axes of the socio-political cleavage, i.e. the Third and the Fourth Republic of Poland division, the solidary Poland – liberal Poland dichotomy or the cleavage concerning the plane crash near Smoleńsk. These factors led to a great polarization of not only the political scene, but also the Polish society. This resulted in the increase of political participation, on both sides of the conflict, of people from the “ideological” group, with rigid views and no inclination towards conciliatory actions.

The new axis of cleavage was the solidary Poland – liberal Poland antinomy. In 2005 the Law and Justice party used the term “solidary Poland” with reference to the increased role of the state in the economic life and the need to liquidate social stratification. The term “solidary Poland” had a decidedly better overtone than “social Poland”. The “solidary Poland” category referred to the activity of the “Solidarity” social movement. That axis of cleavage, although created by political parties, seems to be a real diversification. It definitely functioned earlier, and the elections in 2005 were only a turning point when it was named and adapted by political parties (Cześniak, Kotnarowski, 2011: 132). In the nineties in the 20th century this cleavage included the conflict between people who were satisfied with the course of transformation, who could be described as winners, and people dissatisfied with the changes, especially in terms of economy. Although the division was not clearly articulated in the last decade of the 20th century, one could distinguish the manifestations of the real cleavage. It was mainly evidenced by the shift of the “election pendulum” to the left in 1993, when the voters placed their trust in the Democratic Left Alliance. That party referred to changes in economic policy, which assumed bigger social protection, announcing “authentic” social policy, the fight with unemployment and the limitation of privatisation, which was considered to be one of the causes for social stratification. The dissatisfaction was also visible in a relatively big support for the Self-defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) party, which consistently negated too liberal solutions brought by the transformation.

The division into solidary and liberal Poland largely refers to the real diversification on account of one’s financial status. It is described as a division into the “equal” and “more equal” (Jarosz, 2010: 10). The former are the part of society who benefited the most from the changes which took place during the political transformation. This group significantly changed their financial status by finding gainful employment, fair remuneration, by investing in material assets. They are winners, because for them the period of political transformation is a positive process which really leads to the improvement of the quality of their life.

One of the new axes of the cleavage is the Third Republic of Poland and the Fourth Republic of Poland dichotomy. After the political change of 1989, Poland was described as the Third Republic as a continuation of historical periods: the First and the Second Republic of Poland. The idea of the Fourth Republic of Poland appeared in the nineties in various environments as a criticism and negation of the Third Republic, which, according to critics, did not entirely manage to free itself from the post-communist legacy.

After 2005 the major advantage of two post-Solidarity groupings: the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice party, based on the negation of the ruling method of the entangled in affairs Democratic Left Alliance, meant also the appearance of a new idea: the building of the Fourth Republic of Poland. The concept was supposed to be an alternative to the previous ruling method, the post-Solidarity groups decided that the Third Republic had exhausted the possibilities of functioning, and the process of the moral revival of the state was needed.

Sustaining the current policy of the Third Republic of Poland was a continuation thought to be leading to a crisis. The continuation policy is supposed to mean the maintaining of the tendencies leading to keeping up the crisis and the degradation of Poland to an insignificant country with a marginal economy. It is juxtaposed with the construction of a big, strong European country. These elements were particularly visible in the program of the Law and Justice party (the Fourth Republic of Poland, 2005: 7).

As one of the researchers rightly notes, the subsequent periods in the history of Poland: the First, the Second and the Third Republic, were given their names *post factum*, from the later perspective. The Fourth Republic of Poland is a vision, a project, a period which was yet to happen. Therefore it can be perceived as a concept imposed by elites on the society (Habuda, 2010: 11)

Initially, the idea of the Fourth Republic of Poland was a common concept for the two post-Solidarity groupings, the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice party. Remaining in the parliamentary opposition in 2001-2005, they both presented themselves to the society as the new quality on Polish political scene. Both parties announced the renewal of the political system and the moral revival of the political life. Those plans were supposed to be carried out by a joint ruling coalition. The overlapping of the parliamentary and presidential campaigns and the competition between the leaders: Donald Tusk and Lech Kaczyński ended the cooperation of both parties.

After the setting up of a minority government by the Law and Justice party, the Fourth Republic of Poland was equated with the period of the party's ruling in 2005–2007. This seems to be an oversimplification of the subject, because the idea of the Fourth Republic of Poland remains a prominent political issue.

The construction of the socialist system by the Polish People's Republic was compared to the creation of the foundations of a democratic Poland at the Round Table. Also the Polish People's Republic itself together with the Third Republic of Poland were assessed in the same way. The discourse of defending the achievements of Poland after the political transformation and the effects of democratic reforms was in the opposition (Figiel, 2009: 169).

The period of the ruling of the Civic Platform in 2007–2015, when a coalition with a post-communist Polish People's Party was established, gradual expansion of the party base with politicians who had been connected with the Democratic Left Alliance resulted in the Civic Platform being identified with the side who accepted the period of the Third Republic. Researchers note that the exhaustion of the post-communist cleavage led to the "broadening" of the post-communist stream with the supporters of the Third Republic, supporters of the system and opponents of the extension of the national social policy (Dzwończyk, 2012: 163).

After terminating the cooperation with Law and Justice, the Civic Platform referred to the legacy of the political parties which it originated from (the Liberal Democratic Congress - Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny, the Union of Liberty – Unia Wolności). It accepted the agreements of the Round Table and had a positive attitude to the first years of the political transformation. The party also grew closer to Lech Wałęsa, criticised by the Law and Justice party for his excessive fraternisation with the Polish United Workers' Party camp in 1989. On the other hand, President Bronisław Komorowski, connected with the Civic Platform, when referring to the 25 years of the Polish state used the term "another golden age of Poland", pointing out Polish successes after 1989.

One of the new stimulants of the cleavage was the Smoleńsk plane crash (Szawiel, 2011). The cleavage was built around a few axes. The first one is the attitude towards the explanation of the causes of the crash. On one side there are supporters of improper investigation procedures. They do not exclude an assassination attempt as the cause of the crash. The other side of the dispute are people who maintain that the pilots landed in conditions which made it impossible to land safely. Apparently they acted under pressure, because the refusal to land would have thwarted a symbolic ceremony in Katyń, which President Lech Kaczyński cared about. In their opinion the Smoleńsk crash was a flying accident. One of the axes of the "Smoleńsk cleavage" seems to be the dispute concerning the cross placed in front of the presidential palace in order to commemorate the victims of the crash. One side of the dispute demanded to leave the cross to commemorate the victims of the crash. The other side of the dispute believed the use of the cross and the restoration of the Smoleńsk issues to be the politicisation of the crash and using it for current political fight.

After 2005, religious cleavage was still visible. The problem of the participation of the Catholic Church in political life was a significant axis of that cleavage. Still valid were the axiological disputes included in the cleavage concerning the possibility to have an abortion, *in vitro* fertilization and the discussion concerning the legalisation of same-sex marriages.

Despite the decreased significance of the post-communist grouping, the elements of post-communist cleavage were still visible. Some of the issues overlapped classic axes of the dispute (the assessment of the period of the People's Republic of Poland), other were transferred to the "Third Republic – Fourth Republic" axis (assessment of L. Wałęsa's political activity).

Since 2005 there is a visible tendency for the "ideological" group to be involved in political participation. Too much interest in politics and excessive involvement in political battle can deepen the existing cleavages. People whose motivation is deeply rooted in political cleavages are not susceptible to objective messages that come from the outside. The current socio-political cleavages are characterised by clarity, sharpness and great polarisation of the society.

Conclusions

The political cleavages which appeared in Poland after 2005 were to a large extent initiated by political parties. Instead of serving as a transmission belt between society and authority, the parties were the creators of those cleavages. They also played a significant part in strengthening them. The new axes of cleavages shaped after 2005 are solidary Poland – liberal Poland, the Third Republic of Poland – the Fourth Republic of Poland and the Smoleńsk cleavage. The basic stimulants of these cleavages were: a conflict between two post-Solidarity parties, i.e., the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice party; dissatisfaction of part of society with political transformation; an important decrease in the support for the post-communist left-wing party; and the presidential plane crash near Smoleńsk. Religious cleavage is still present referring to the place of the Catholic Church in political life, the issue of abortion and *in vitro*, and the legalisation of same-sex marriages. Despite the fact that the political scene is dominated by post-Solidarity groupings, the elements of post-communist cleavage are still visible. In the context of ensuing new axes of cleavage, the dysfunctionality of political parties is noticeable. Their role should not be just "to translate" the cleavages into the political system, but to moderate them. However, the actions of the two most important parties in Poland, i.e., the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice party, show a clear tendency to strengthen the polarization, thus to stabilise the new axes of socio-political cleavage.

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PERSISKIRSTYMAI LENKIJOS POLITIKOJE PO 2005 METŲ RINKIMŲ

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Santrauka

Šio tyrimo tikslas – analizuoti naujas balsuotojų grupes, kurios susidarė Lenkijoje po 2005 metų. Taikomi lyginamasis ir istorinis analizės metodai. Šiuo tyrimu nustatyta, kad susiskaldymas Lenkijoje tik iš dalies atitinka įprastą susiskaldymą. Nustatyti ir išanalizuoti nauji politinio susiskaldymo Lenkijoje po 2005 metų skatinimo šaltiniai. Gyventojų susiskaldymą didino politinių partijų interesai, siekis dominuoti valdžioje.

Politinių pažiūrų skirtumai, išryškėję Lenkijoje po 2005 metų, labiausiai skatinti politinių partijų. Vietoj to, kad būtų visuomenės ir valdžios jungiamoji grandis, partijos pačios siekė pabrėžti savo idėjų išskirtinumą,

tuo kiršino gyventojus. Naujosios grupės ir jų konfliktai, kilę po 2005 metų, yra: Vieninga Lenkija ir Liberali Lenkija, Trečioji Lenkijos Respublika ir Ketvirtoji Lenkijos Respublika bei įvykusi Smolensko tragedija, kai žuvo tuometinis prezidentas ir jo palyda. Dviejų buvusių Solidarumo partijų – Piliečių platformos bei Teisės ir teisingumo – konfliktą paskatino dalies visuomenės nepasitenkinimas esama politine transformacija, pokomunistinės kairiosios partijos nebepalaikymas ir prezidentinio lėktuvo katastrofa prie Smolensko. Taip pat ir religinė įtampa po 2005 metų, kilusi dėl Katalikų Bažnyčios vietos politiniame gyvenime, abortų, dirbtinio apvaisinimo ir tos pačios lyties santuokų klausimų. Nors politinėje scenoje dominuoja buvusios Solidarumo partijos, pokomunistinių partijų įtaka vis dar akivaizdi. Naujų konfliktinių taškų kontekste matoma politinių partijų disfunkcija. Jų vaidmuo turėtų būti ne „perkelti“ šiuos įtampos taškus į politinę sistemą, o juos suvaldyti. Tačiau dviejų pagrindinių partijų Lenkijoje – Piliečių platformos bei Teisės ir teisingumo – elgesys rodo tendenciją, kad susiskaldymas didėja, taip stiprėja naujieji sociopolitiniai susipriešinimo taškai.

PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: *sociopolitinis susipriešinimas, politinės partijos, pereinamasis laikotarpis Lenkijoje.*

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